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CONTEXTUALLY-CONTROLLED SEMANTIC FALSE MEMORIES IN THE
FORM OF DERIVED RELATIONAL INTRUSIONS FOLLOWING TRAINING

by

Paul Guinther

B.A., M.A.
Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
Modified versions of the original Derived Relational Intrusions Following
Training paradigm (DRIFT; Guinther & Dougher, 2010) were used to engineer semantic
false memories and contextually-controlled semantic false memories in group data.
Experiment I replicated and extended the original DRIFT paradigm by showing that
interrelated conditional discrimination training (match-to-sample; MTS) could influence
subsequent false recall even in the absence of tests of symmetry and transitivity. It was
also found that false recall was especially likely among those participants whose self
reports indicated awareness that the study list words shared a common conditionally
discriminative function. Experiment II required participants to complete a contextuallycontrolled MTS training procedure in which study list words were assigned to participate
in a functional equivalence class with one set of non-study words in one context but with
a different set of non-study words in a different context. Subsequent transfer of the study
list words’ remembering function to non-study words (i.e., false recall) was found to be

vii
dependent upon the context in which the free recall test was administered, thus
demonstrating engineered contextual control of semantic false memory.
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Contextual DRIFT 1
Introduction
Semantic false memory phenomena have typically been studied by cognitive
psychologists, who use these phenomena to infer the properties of cognitive processes
and structures thought to be responsible for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of
information (e.g., see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2006). False memory phenomena
are also of direct interest to those researchers who are interested in understanding
allegations of childhood sexual abuse (e.g., Ceci & Friedman, 2000; Goodman & ClarkeStewart, 1991; Lyon, 1995) and the credibility eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1975;
Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Such cognitive and applied investigations have been useful in
the elaboration of schema theory (e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Minsky, 1975; Schank
& Abelson, 1977), which in turn forms the theoretical rationale underlying a major
branch of psychotherapy (i.e., cognitive therapy; Beck, 1976). In order to characterize
semantic false memory phenomena in terms of the environmental variables of interest to
behavior analysts, we (Guinther & Dougher, 2010) recently developed the Derived
Relational Intrusions Following Training (DRIFT) paradigm.
The DRIFT paradigm was designed to produce experimentally some of the
semantic behaviors exhibited during implementations of its paradigmatic predecessor,
namely the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959a, 1959b;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm has been enormously useful in the
study of semantic false memory phenomena, showing that preexperimentally established
semantic relationships are predictive of specific memory intrusions (i.e., instances of
false recall). For example, given a list of preexperimentally semantically related words to
remember such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snore etc., a person in an English-
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speaking community is likely to erroneously recall the semantically-related word sleep,
even though this word was not on the original study list. Thus, the DRM paradigm allows
researchers to predict the likelihood of specific intrusions from measures of semantic
relations, though the semantic relations themselves were presumably established prior to
experimentation.
In order to insure the semantic relatedness of DRM study words to particular nonstudy words, the original DRM study lists were constructed using nomothetic information
gathered during free association tasks (Deese, 1959a, 1959b). Participants were asked to
state the first word that came to mind following the presentation of probing root words,
and their responses were recorded. Modal responses (i.e., words that would become the
DRM study list items) to the root words (i.e., words presumed to be likely intrusions)
were to be expected, given that the participants had extensive common natural learning
histories with respect to the use of the root words. That is, all of the participants had been
exposed to historical environments that promoted the speaking of coherent English, in
which specific utterances were likely to have been reinforced under specific
circumstances. For example, in English-speaking communities one is likely to be
reinforced for emitting the words sleep, bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snore, etc. in the
presence of sleeping people and in the presence of beds etc., and also in the presence of
these same words. With respect to the intraverbal operants frequently emitted during free
association tasks, Skinner (1957) elaborates on the historical interaction between
nonverbal and verbal stimuli and the reinforcement of subsequent verbal responses:
We may assume … that, aside from intraverbal sequences specifically
acquired, a verbal stimulus will be an occasion for the reinforcement of a
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verbal response of different form when, for any reason, the two forms
frequently occur together. A common reason is that the nonverbal
circumstances under which they are emitted occur together. … We may
speak of the tendency to occur together as ‘contiguous usage.’ In the usual
word-association experiment, [many of the observed] intraverbal operants
appear to be explained by contiguous usage. There are times when it is
well to have certain operants in readiness…when talking about lakes, it is
advantageous to have the form sea available. In accounting for a specific
intraverbal operant it is necessary to substitute an actual reinforcing event
for an “advantage.” In general, however, it is enough to show that the form
sea is likely to occur in the context of lake; animal in the context of cat;
tears in the context of pain; and so on. … Certain exceptions, in which
frequency of response does not follow frequent contiguous usage, may be
traced to specific reinforcements, especially where responses have a
limited currency or where the history of the speaker is unusual. (Skinner,
1957, p. 75)
It then appears that one way to produce DRM-like semantic false memory
phenomena would be to influence contiguous usage. That is, false memory phenomena
may follow from learning histories in which the emission of a word (i.e., a word that
would be considered to be an intrusion in a subsequent memory test, such as sleep) in the
presence of some other word (i.e., a word used as a study item in a subsequent memory
test, such as bed) had been reinforced on past occasions. More specifically, it is possible
that intraverbal operants arising from contiguous usage and emitted during free
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association tests are also likely to be emitted during free recall tests, and such behaviors
would then be labeled by researchers as false memory phenomena.
In contrast to Skinner’s depiction of the contingencies involved in contiguous
usage, many cognitive psychologists emphasize mere stimulus co-occurrence as the
source of semantic relations (e.g., Burgess, 1998; Fodor, 1983; Foltz, 1996; Landauer &
Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998; Lund & Burgess, 1996; see also
Hutchison, 2003), which would imply that false memories are ultimately traceable to
historical stimulus co-occurrence. That is, the functional relationship between stimuli is
often ignored by cognitive psychologists, whose explanations are instead cast in terms of
an information-processing metaphor. While there are a multitude of cognitive
explanations of semantic relatedness, one prominent cognitive metaphor maintains that
the degree semantic relatedness between stimuli is a reflection of the degree of
association between mental representations of the stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins
& Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992). The strength of association between representations
is thought to increase following the simultaneous activation of the mental representations
of the stimuli, and, in turn, the simultaneous activation of the mental representations can
result from the perceived co-occurrence of stimulus referents. For example, if the word
sleep frequently co-occurs with the words bed, rest awake, etc., then the representations
of these words would become strongly associated within a hypothetical mental
architecture. Further supposing that a memory retrieval system relies on stimulus
associations for its cognitive functioning (e.g., Roediger et a. 2001), the retrieval of the
words bed, rest, awake, etc. could lead to the erroneous retrieval of the strongly
associated word sleep. That is, a cognitive psychologist may say that sleep is intruded in
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the DRM paradigm because sleep is associated with bed, rest, awake, etc., which is to say
that these words have frequently co-occurred on past occasions. Of note, Skinner’s
contiguous usage could be reduced to stimulus co-occurrence, should the functional
relations between stimuli (e.g., those relations arising from operant contingencies) prove
to be inconsequential to subsequent remembering behavior.
However, it may also be the case that false memory phenomena can arise from
learning histories in which the relationships between words are not the result of direct
reinforcement or stimulus co-occurrence (as is the case with contiguous usage), but are
instead acquired indirectly. That is, it is well established that relationships between
stimuli can be derived (see Hayes, Barnes-Homes, & Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1971, 1994;
Sidman & Tailby, 1982), suggesting the possibility that certain false memory phenomena
may result from those environmental manipulations that promote the derivation of
stimulus relations. We (Guinther & Dougher, 2010) recently tested this possibility
through the DRIFT paradigm, showing that interrelated conditional discrimination
training (match-to-sample, MTS) with tests of symmetry and transitivity (see Sidman
1971; Sidman 1994; Sidman & Tailby 1982) was sufficient for the derivation of novel
semantic relationships, and that the training likewise resulted in corresponding semantic
false memories. Specifically, a group of random English words was assigned to a
common stimulus equivalence class for MTS training, stimulus equivalence was tested,
and then a subset of the words from within the class was presented for memorization. On
subsequent tests of free recall and recognition, words that had been assigned to the same
class as the study list words were more likely to be intruded and falsely recognized than
words that had been assigned to different classes. Furthermore, stimuli that frequently co-
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occurred with study list words during prior MTS training were not especially likely to be
intruded or falsely recognized on subsequent memory tests. We interpreted these findings
to reflect the differential transfer of an instructed “remembering” function from study
words to same-class non-study words; the intrusions and false recognitions reflected the
formation of corresponding functional equivalence classes (see Donahoe & Palmer, 2004;
Dougher & Markham, 1994, 1996; Goldiamond, 1962, 1966). Importantly, there were no
preexperimental semantic relationships between study list words and intruded or falsely
recognized words. Instead, artificial semantic relationships were created through the
experimental manipulation of environmental variables promoting the derivation of
stimulus relations, and, hence, semantic false memory phenomena were likewise
controlled.
It is important to keep in mind that there are several different ways of
conceptualizing “semantic relations.” Within the field of cognitive psychology, semantic
relations are typically conceived of as being embodied in structural linkages between
informational representations of linguistic terms and physical referents (e.g., Anderson,
1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992); cognitive psychologists use public
behaviors to infer the properties of these mental (i.e., hypothetical, cognitive) semantic
structures. In contrast, behavior analysts make no appeal to mental structures in their
accounts of semantic relations. Instead, semantic relations are considered to be manifest
in particular behaviors, and these behaviors are to be understood in terms of the
conditions under which they occur. According to one line of behavior analytic thinking
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005; Hayes & Bisset, 1998; Sidman, 1994), semantic behaviors
occur when the stimuli controlling these behaviors have acquired their functions
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indirectly through derived relationships. That is, semantic behaviors are thought to occur
under the conditions that give rise to derived relational responding. For example, if a
person is trained or instructed that A=B and A=C, the spontaneous (i.e., untrained and
uninstructed) emission of behaviors consistent with the relation B=C would be taken as
evidence that there is a semantic relation between B and C. This type of semantic
behavior is often exhibited by verbally competent individuals following MTS training, as
was found in the original DRIFT study when participants derived equivalence between
study words and non-study words that had been assigned to a common class (Guinther &
Dougher, 2010).
The two experiments in the current study were designed to replicate and extend
the original DRIFT paradigm. Experiment I was intended to more closely specify the
MTS training characteristics essential for the production of subsequent semantic false
memories. In particular, we wished to determine if tests of symmetry and transitivity
during MTS were necessary components of the paradigm, and therefore did not include
them in the current DRIFT designs. That is, if stimulus equivalence and functional
equivalence are both the product of a common learning history (e.g., MTS training; see
McIlvane & Dube, 1990), then, following such a history, demonstrations of stimulus
equivalence should not be necessary for demonstrations of functional equivalence (i.e.,
higher levels of intruding for words assigned to the same class as study words should be
evident even in the absence of tests for stimulus equivalence).
Also differing from the original DRIFT design, the study list words’ MTS sample
stimulus was not displayed during study list presentation in Experiment I. When
participants were ostensibly memorizing the study list words under the original DRIFT
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design, the presence of the sample stimulus may have influenced participants’
interpretations of the meanings of the words. For example, if all of the study list words
came from a class in which a red square served as the conditional sample during MTS,
the presence of the red square during study list memorization could have helped some
participants abstract that all of the words came from the same class. As such, the presence
of the sample stimulus could have influenced performance on subsequent memory tests.
As an exploratory manipulation in Experiment I, we did not present the study words’
MTS sample during study list presentation and later asked participants whether they were
aware that all of the study words came from the same class.
Experiment II of the current study was intended to extend the original DRIFT
study through the introduction of manipulations that are known to affect derived
relationships and the transfer of stimulus functions. Specifically, equivalence responding
can be brought under contextual control through appropriate environmental
manipulations (Wulfert & Hayes, 1988), and we therefore anticipated that comparable
manipulations could lead to the contextual control of semantic false memory phenomena.
In the traditional DRM paradigm, the study list words may themselves serve as
contextual variables that mutually establish meaning. For example, the word rest is
semantically related to sleep in the context of pillow, awake, and tired, but rest is
semantically related to silence in the context of note, measure, and staff. That is, some
words have more than one meaning, depending on context. Given that meaning is
oftentimes context dependent, it would follow that false memory could likewise be
context dependent.
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Consider, for example, the hypothetical list of study words in Table 1. The
meaning of the study words might align with either BUSINESS or FARM depending on
the context of presentation (e.g., an office versus a barn), and one might expect
subsequent intrusions to be similarly aligned. That is, the natural learning histories of
English-speaking persons are such that the study words share a context-dependent
conditionally discriminative function with certain other words (e.g., stock and capital are
interchangeable responses in the context of BUSINESS, whereas stock and lineage are
interchangeable responses in the context of FARM). Consequently, one would predict
that the direct acquisition of a remembering function by the study items would be
indirectly acquired by words sharing a common contextually-controlled conditionally
discriminative function (see Wulfert & Hayes, 1988). Such an effect would manifest in
the form of context-dependent memory intrusions.
The preceding example involving naturally-occurring semantic relationships is
speculative, and does not specify a particular learning history responsible for the
proposed effect. Rather than testing the speculative example, we sought to demonstrate in
Experiment II the effects of contextually-controlled MTS training on subsequent false
memory, using words sharing no particular preexperimental semantic relationships. That
is, we employed a contextually-controlled MTS procedure to produce contextuallycontrolled semantic relationships, as evidenced by contextually-controlled functional
equivalence responding in the form of contextually-controlled false recall. Stimulus cooccurrence of study words and non-study words was held constant across contexts during
MTS training in order to highlight the important role that contingencies can play in the
creation of derived functional relationships and semantic false memories.
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Table 1
Hypothetical example of naturalistic contextual control of semantic false memory
phenomena
CONTEXT: BUSINESS
Natural Equivalences

CONTEXT: FARM
Study Words

Natural Equivalences

capital

←

stock

→

lineage

Shop

←

store

→

supplies

upward

←

bull

→

breeder

downward

←

bear

→

predator

Sum

←

aggregate

→

soil

factory

←

plant

→

sew

criminal

←

crook

→

staff

↓

↓

Intrusions

Intrusions

capital

lineage

downward

predator

criminal

staff

Contextual DRIFT 11
Experiment I
Method
Participants. A total of 43 undergraduate psychology students were recruited
through a departmental web advertisement and participated in Experiment I for course
credit; 1 graduate student also participated in the study and did not receive compensation.
Data are omitted for 3 participants who failed to pass the MTS training portion of the
experiment and for 1 participant who failed to follow directions during the free recall task,
leaving a total of 40 participants (20 males and 20 females) in the final sample. The mean
age of participants in the final sample was 20.80 years (SD = 2.96; Range = 18-29) and
their mean level of education was 13.48 years (SD = 1.52; Range = 12-19).
Setting, Apparatus, and Materials. Participants completed Experiment I in a quiet
2 m x 2 m laboratory in the Psychology Department at the University of New Mexico.
The room contained two chairs, a desk, and a standard desktop computer equipped with a
mouse for making responses and a 43.2 cm (17 inch) monitor on which stimuli were
presented. The computer program for presenting stimuli and collecting responses was
written by the first author and is available upon request. A total of 48 words were chosen
as experimental stimuli (from Wilson, 1988) on the basis that there was no obvious theme
uniting them; the list contained adjectives, adverbs, nouns, and verbs (see Figure 1). For
each participant on an individual basis, 24 words were randomly assigned to be “red
square words” (RSW’s) and 24 words were randomly assigned to be “blue circle words”
(BCW’s). Each RSW was randomly paired with a BCW, producing 24 different word
pairs that served as comparison stimuli in the MTS task described below. Finally, 12 of
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the RSW’s were randomly assigned for each participant to be study list words on the free

T1

BCW’s

n

l

AIRPORT
AROSE
BATHROOM
BECAME
BLONDE
BLOWING
CANDLE
CANNOT
CEILING
CHARMING
CLOTHING
CONCERT
JUDGMENT
LAUGHING
MEANING
MINUTE
MOTEL
OPENING
PICNIC
PLASTIC
POLITICS
SALESMEN
SLIDING
STATED

COWBOY
CRISES
DANCING
DEALT
DESERT
EARNINGS
EATING
ESSAY
ETHICS
FLOATING
FOREST
GRANDMA
STOLEN
SWOLLEN
TEETH
THERMAL
THYROID
TIRED
TODAY
TRAFFIC
UNLIKE
VIOLIN
WHILE
YOUNG

T4

T3

RSW’s

T2

(Free Recall)

recall task, also described below.

T0 (Extra-experimental Intrusions)

Figure 1. The 48 words used in Experiment I. Although shown in alphabetical order here,
the words were randomly assigned to one of four Types (T1-T4) for each participant. T1
and T3 words were red square words (RSW’s), and T2 and T4 words were blue circle
words (BSW’s). T1 words were studied list words for the free recall portion of the
experiment. Any intrusions that were not T2-T4 words were classified as T0 words.
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Procedure. After meeting the experimenter and signing statements of informed
consent, participants began the experiment with a computerized training procedure. This
training was intended to establish two 24-member functional equivalence classes and
consisted of an arbitrary, two-comparison, MTS task. Training followed a one-to-many
format, with the colored shapes (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) always serving as
samples and the words as comparisons. Participants read the following instructions on the
computer screen and any questions were clarified by the experimenter:
Welcome to the experiment! In this part of the experiment, you will see
either a square or circle in the top third of the screen and a pair of words
on the bottom third of the screen. Your job is to pick the word that
"matches" the current shape. You can pick the word on the left by pressing
the left mouse button, or pick the word on the right by pressing the right
mouse button. If you pick the correct word you will see a happy face, and
if you pick the incorrect word you will see a sad face. Once you pick the
correct word from the pair twice in a row, the shape will change. Then you
will have to match a word from the pair to the new shape. You will get a
new pair of words once you have successfully matched twice in a row for
the square and the circle. Then you will continue with this same process
for a number of word pairs. There are a limited number of word pairs.
Once you have gone through all of the word pairs, you will get feedback
about your performance. If you get a high enough score, we will move on
to the next part of the experiment. It is important for the experiment that
you learn which words go with which shapes, so if your score isn't high
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enough, you will go through all of the word pairs again until your memory
score is high enough. Please let the experimenter know if you have any
questions. Press [SPACE BAR] to start training.
As depicted in Figure 1, there were five Types of words. Type zero (T0) words
were any words other than the 48 words used as stimuli in the experiment, representing
extra-experimental intrusions during the free recall task. Type one (T1) words were the
12 RSW’s that were randomly assigned to be study list words during the free recall task.
Type two (T2) words were the 12 BCW’s paired with the T1 words as comparisons
during MTS training; T1 and T2 words frequently co-occurred during MTS training.
Type three (T3) words were the remaining 12 RSW’s that were non-study words. Type
four (T4) words were the 12 BCW’s paired with the T3 words as comparisons during
MTS training; T3 and T4 words frequently co-occurred during MTS training.
On each training trial, a sample shape (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) appeared
in the center of the top third of the computer screen and two words (i.e., a T1-T2 pair or
a T3-T4 pair) appeared on either side of the bottom third of the computer screen. The
left-right positions of the two words in a pair were randomly determined on each trial,
and participants were required to select one of the two words using a left or right mousebutton press. Correct responses were scored if the participant selected a RSW in the
presence of the red square sample or a BCW in the presence of the blue circle sample.
Correct responses were followed by the presentation of a happy face and a pleasant chime
sound, whereas incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of a sad face and
an unpleasant buzz sound. A cash reward of $100 was promised and awarded to the
participant who completed MTS training with the fewest number of errors.
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Each MTS training block consisted of 24 trial sets consisting of some number of
trials with each of the 24 word pairs. The number of trials required to complete a set
depended on the participants’ performance. The order of set presentation was randomly
determined at the beginning of each block. The first time a word pair appeared in a set of
trials, the sample was randomly determined and stayed the same on each trial until the
participant made two consecutive correct responses. At that point the sample shape
changed from square to circle or from circle to square. Once the participant made two
consecutive correct responses to the second sample, the set of trials for that word pair was
completed and a new word pair and sample appeared. At the end of a block of 24 trial
sets, the percentage of completely correct trial sets (i.e., when no errors were made for a
word pair) was calculated for the block. Training blocks continued until a 90% trial set
accuracy criterion was achieved; a perfectly logical “win stay, lose switch” strategy based
on a random response to the first trial of each set would produce a 50% trial set accuracy
for that block. Thus, while the 90% criterion is an arbitrary cutoff, it is highly unlikely
that participants could have achieved this level of performance without learning the
conditional discriminations. Those participants who failed to achieve the accuracy
criterion after 40 minutes were dismissed (N = 3), and no further data were collected from
them. Unlike the original DRIFT design, there were no tests of symmetry or transitivity.
Following MTS training, participants were required to leave the laboratory and
take a break for approximately 5 min. Once they returned, they were told that they were
entering a new phase of the experiment, and were given the following instructions for the
free recall task:
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For the next part of the experiment, we will show you some words that we
want you to remember for a later memory test. The words will
automatically appear one at a time on the screen. These words that you are
about to see are the MEMORY TEST words. Please ask the experimenter
if you have any questions. The words will begin to appear once you press
the [SPACE BAR].
The 12 T1 words were then presented on the computer screen one at a time for 2 s
each with a 2 s inter-stimulus interval, during which the screen was blank. Unlike the
original DRIFT design, the memory test words’ sample stimulus (i.e., red square) did not
appear on the screen during study presentation in Experiment I. Following presentation of
the T1 study list words, participants were shown a screen instructing them to “Remember
the MEMORY TEST words!” and were then handed a one page article on global
dimming, which they were asked to read as a distractor task. The distractor task was not
timed. After reading the article, participants were given a pen and a blank sheet of paper
and were instructed to write down as many of the study list (T1 free recall) words as they
could remember, and to notify the experimenter when they had finished. Then the
experimenter manually entered the recalled words into the computer for scoring, making
corrections for misspellings, plurality, or suffix substitutions (e.g., CRISIS was recorded
as CRISES; FLOAT was recorded as FLOATING).
Part way through collecting data for Experiment I, we realized that it might be of
interest to record whether or not participants were aware that all of the memory test
words were RSW’s. From that point on, at the end of the experiment, participants were
first asked “Did you notice anything in particular about the memory tests words?” If the
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participant answered in the negative, they were then asked “All of the memory test words
had something in common. Did you notice what it was?” If this was also answered in the
negative, they were asked “Did you notice that all of the memory test words were red
square words?” If the participant answered in the affirmative to any of these questions,
they were asked to clarify their response. If questioning indicated that the participants had
noticed the RSW connection between the memory test words, they were classified as
being “Aware” (n = 6), and if they did not noticed they were classified as being
“Unaware” (n = 21). Given the relatively low number of Aware participants (i.e., in terms
of statistical reliability), we ran separate analyses for the total sample and for those
participants for whom awareness data were collected.
Results
The number of blocks participants took to complete MTS training ranged from 2
to10 (Mean = 5.73; SD = 1.85). On the free recall task, participants from the total sample
recalled an average of 6.33 correct T1 words (SD = 2.17; Range = 3-11). Participants
from the Aware sample recalled an average of 7.17 correct T1 words (SD = 1.33; Range
= 6-9). Participants from the Unaware sample recalled an average of 6.43 correct T1
words (SD = 2.38; Range = 3-11). There was no significant difference between the
Aware and Unaware participants in the mean number of words correctly recalled, t(25) =
0.72, p = .48. Information regarding the number of intrusions for the total sample, the
Aware participants, and the Unaware participants can be found in Table 2. Individual
participant data can be found in Table 3.
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Table 2
Intrusion Data for the Total Sample, Aware Participants, and Unaware Participants in
Experiment I
Sample

Type

N

% of Sum

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Total (N = 40)

T0

13

17.7

0.33

.57

0

2

T2

14

18.9

0.35

.70

0

3

T3

37

50.0

0.93

1.29

0

5

T4

10

13.5

0.25

.54

0

2

Sum

74

100

1.85

1.72

0

6

T0

1

7.7

0.17

0.41

0

1

T2

0

0.0

0.00

0.00

0

0

T3

10

76.9

1.67

1.63

0

4

T4

2

15.4

0.33

0.82

0

2

Sum

13

100

2.17

1.47

0

4

T0

7

20.6

0.33

0.58

0

2

T2

10

29.4

0.48

0.87

0

3

T3

12

35.3

0.57

1.21

0

5

T4

5

14.7

0.24

0.54

0

2

Sum

34

100

1.62

1.86

0

6

Aware (n = 6)

Unaware (n = 21)
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Table 3
Individual Participant Data from Experiment I
Intrusions

Training
Case

Order Tested

Blocks

Aware

T1

T0

T2

T3

T4

1

1

6

.

4

0

1

0

0

2

2

6

.

6

0

1

0

0

3

3

6

.

9

0

0

0

0

4

4

4

.

3

0

0

1

1

5

5

2

.

6

0

0

1

0

6

6

4

.

7

0

0

3

0

7

7

6

.

9

1

0

0

0

8

8

4

.

8

0

0

0

0

9

9

5

.

4

0

0

2

0

10

10

4

.

6

0

1

3

0

11

11

6

.

3

0

1

2

1

12

12

5

.

4

0

0

2

0

13

13

4

.

6

2

0

1

1

14

16

5

Yes

8

1

0

4

0

15

17

6

Yes

6

1

0

3

0

16

25

4

Yes

8

1

0

2

0

17

29

9

Yes

9

0

0

0

2
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Table 3 (cont.)
18

31

10

Yes

6

1

0

0

0

19

40

4

Yes

6

0

0

1

0

20

14

6

No

5

1

0

0

0

21

15

5

No

4

0

0

0

0

22

18

6

No

8

0

3

0

0

23

19

8

No

3

0

0

0

0

24

20

4

No

9

0

1

0

0

25

21

7

No

9

0

0

1

0

26

22

6

No

6

0

0

0

0

27

23

8

No

4

0

0

0

0

28

24

8

No

8

0

1

0

1

29

26

9

No

4

0

0

0

0

30

27

8

No

3

0

0

0

0

31

28

6

No

8

0

1

5

0

32

30

4

No

5

0

0

0

1

33

32

8

No

5

0

2

1

2

34

33

5

No

9

0

0

0

0

35

34

5

No

5

0

0

0

0

36

35

4

No

10

0

2

2

1

37

36

5

No

7

1

0

1

0
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Table 3 (cont.)
38

37

3

No

5

0

0

0

0

39

38

5

No

7

0

0

2

0

40

39

9

No

11

0

0

0

0
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We present data on the occurrence of T0 intrusions, as this phenomenon may be
of some conceptual interest to readers. However, we did not include T0 intrusions in our
formal analyses because these words were likely to have been recalled on the basis of
uncontrolled extra-experimental learning histories. Of the experimental stimuli, we
anticipated that T4 words would be the least likely to be intruded on the grounds that T4
words never co-occurred with T1 words, and because T4 words were not assigned to
participate in the same class as T1 words. As such, T4 words would be the least likely to
indirectly acquire the remembering function of the T1 words. We therefore conducted
two comparisons using the mean number of T4 intrusions as a baseline: a) the difference
between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions, which would reveal the effect of cooccurrence for T1 and T2 words relative to the absence of co-occurrence for T1 and T4
words, and b) the difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions, which
would reveal the influence of shared class assignment by T1 and T3 words relative to the
absence of co-occurrence and differential class membership for T1 and T4 words. We
also examined the difference between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions, which
would reveal the effects of shared class assignment relative to co-occurrence.
Experiment I intrusion data for the total sample can be seen in Figure 2. A oneway within-subjects ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity
indicated a significant difference among the mean number of T2, T3, and T4 intrusions in
the total sample, F(1.42, 55.52) = 6.97, p = .005, η2 = .15. Post hoc analyses were
conducted using pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction. The test of the cooccurrence effect showed that the difference between the mean number of T2 intrusions
and T4 intrusions was not significant (p = .999). However, the difference between the

Contextual DRIFT 23
mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions was significant (p = .014) as was the difference
between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p = .042), indicating a relatively

Mean Number of Intrusions (SE)

strong effect of shared class assignment.

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
T2

T3

T4

Intrusion Type

Figure 2. The mean number of intrusions by Type for the total sample in Experiment I.

Separate analyses were run for those participants who had been classified
according to their awareness that all of the study words were RSW’s. Data for these
analyses can be seen in Figure 3. A 2 x 3 (Awareness x Intrusion Type) mixed-design
ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity indicated a nonsignificant
main effect of Awareness, (1, 25) = 0.72, p = .403, partial η2 = .03, and a significant main
effect of Intrusion Type, F(1.43, 35.81) = 5.81, p = .012, partial η2 = .19. However, these
results must be interpreted in light of a significant interaction between Awareness and
Intrusion Type, (1.43, 35.81) = 3.74, p = .047, partial η2 = .13. Analyses of the simple
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main effect of Intrusion Type at each level of Awareness were conducted using pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections. Among the Aware participants, there was no
significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .912), or
between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p = .116). However, the difference
between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions was significant (p = .019). Among the
Unaware participants, there was no significant difference between the mean number of
T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .520), between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p
= .925), or between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p = .999). Thus, only the

Mean Number of Intrusions (SE)

Aware participants gave any indication of elevated T3 intrusions.

2.5

T2
T3
T4

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Aware

Unaware

Awareness

Figure 3. The interaction between Awareness and Intrusion Type in Experiment I.
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Experiment I Discussion
The results of Experiment I replicate the findings of the original DRIFT design,
and indicate that tests of symmetry and transitivity are not essential components of the
DRIFT paradigm. Even in the absence of tests of stimulus equivalence, non-study words
that had been assigned to participate in the same functional equivalence class as study list
words were more likely to be intruded than non-study words that had been assigned to a
different class. Furthermore, participants’ self-report data suggests that the occurrence of
elevated same-class intruding was largely limited to those participants who abstracted
that all of the study list words came from a common class (i.e., the finding was largely
limited to those participants who reported that they were aware that all of the memory
test words were “red square words”). While the variables determining reports of
awareness were not systematically addressed in the current study, demonstrating a
correlation between awareness and intruding represents an important first step in
identifying additional environmental variables, outside of MTS training, that can
influence false recall.
In addition to addressing the question of whether equivalence testing is essential
to the DRIFT paradigm, Experiment I also served as a pilot study for the design of
Experiment II. First, although we did not measure the proposed effect, we presumed that
the inclusion of the sample stimulus during study list presentation in the original DRIFT
design would assist participants in abstracting the common conditionally discriminative
function of the study list words, thereby boosting subsequent false recall. The Awareness
findings of Experiment I were not inconsistent with this presumption, and we therefore
reintroduced the presentation of the sample stimulus during study list presentation in

Contextual DRIFT 26
Experiment II in an attempt to maximize effects. Second, we did not want contextuallycontrolled MTS training to be overly burdensome to participants in Experiment II, so
Experiment I was intended to test the plausibility of a relatively streamlined version of
the original DRIFT design. Specifically, there were three classes (and equivalence
testing) in the original design, but only two classes in Experiment I. Given that we were
able to produce the intended false recall effects under the streamlined design of
Experiment I, this design served as the foundation for the ostensibly more difficult
contextually-controlled MTS training of Experiment II.

Contextual DRIFT 27
Experiment II
Method
Participants. A total of 83 undergraduate psychology students were recruited
through a departmental web advertisement and participated in Experiment II for course
credit; none of them had participated in Experiment I. Although all participants received
comparable contextually-controlled interrelated conditional discrimination training
during the first phase of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a
Context 1 (C1) group or a Context 2 (C2) group for the memory test phase of the
experiment. The data from several participants were omitted from analyses due to failures
to comply with the experimental procedure (n = 5), spontaneous disclosures of
neurological disorders (n = 3), the spontaneous disclosure of recent severe distress (n =
1), highly atypical responding (n = 1), or failures to pass discriminative training by
completing a block of MTS training with 90% trial set accuracy within the allotted time
(n = 25), leaving a total sample of 48 participants.
Setting, Apparatus, and Materials. Experiment II involved the same setting and
apparatus as Experiment I. MTS training stimuli in Experiment II were similar to those
employed in Experiment I, including the same red square and blue circle sample stimuli.
However, only 40 of the words from Experiment I were used as comparison stimuli in
Experiment II (see Figure 4). The number of words per Type was reduced in an attempt
to make it easier for participants to learn the contextually-controlled conditional
discriminations within the allotted time. Depending on context (C1 or C2), words were
presented either on a magenta background in white, italic, 20 point, Orlando font (C1), or
on a green background in black, regular, 18 point, Jokewood font (C2).
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Context 1

T0

BCW’s

RSW’s

T1
(Free Recall)

n

T3

l

AIRPORT T1
2
BATHROOM T1
3
BECAME T1
4
BLONDE T1
5
BLOWING T1
6
CANDLE T1
7
CEILING T1
8
CHARMING T1
9
COWBOY T1
10
DANCING T1
1
DEALT T3
2
DESERT T3
3
EARNINGS T3
4
EATING T3
5
ESSAY T3
6
ETHICS T3
7
FLOATING T3
8
FOREST T3
9
GRANDMA T3
10
JUDGMENT T3

1

l

T2 LAUGHING
2
T2 MEANING
3
T2 MINUTE
4
T2 MOTEL
5
T2 OPENING
6
T2 PICNIC
7
T2 PLASTIC
8
T2 POLITICS
9
T2 SLIDING
10
T2 STATED
1
T4 STOLEN
2
T4 SWOLLEN
3
T4 THERMAL
4
T4 THYROID
5
T4 TIRED
6
T4 TODAY
7
T4 TRAFFIC
8
T4 UNLIKE
9
T4 VIOLIN
10
T4 YOUNG

T4

BCW’s

Context 2

1

T2

RSW’s

n

Figure 4. The 40 words used in Experiment II. Although shown in alphabetical order here,
the words were randomly assigned to one of four Types (T1-T4) for each participant. T1
words were RSW’s regardless of context, and were studied list words for the free recall
portion of the experiment. T2 words were BCW’s in C1 but RSW’s in C2. T3 words were
RSW’s in C1 but BCW’s in C2. T4 words were BCW’s regardless of context. Any
intrusions that were not T2-T4 words were classified as T0 words. Superscripts denote
specific randomly-assigned words of a given Type, and can be cross-referenced with
Table 4.

Procedure. Experiment II followed the same general progression as Experiment I.
Experiment II began with a computerized MTS training procedure intended to establish
four contextually-controlled, 20-member functional equivalence classes via a contextual,
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arbitrary, two-comparison, MTS task. Participants read the same instructions as were
presented in Experiment I. The experimenter also gave the following verbal instructions
to participants: “There are actually three things you will have to pay attention to: the
words, the shapes, and also the background color of the screen makes a difference. So
between the background color of the screen and the shape, there is enough information to
tell you which of the two words you should pick. Do you have any questions?” Any
questions were then clarified by the experimenter.
For each participant, the 40 stimulus words were randomly assigned to one of four
Types (see Figure 4). T0 words were any words other than the 40 words used as stimuli
in the experiment, representing extra-experimental intrusions during the free recall task.
T1 words were always RSW’s regardless of context, and were presented as study items
during the free recall memory test. T2 words were BCW’s that were consistently paired
with T1 words in C1, but were same-class non-study RSW’s in C2. T3 words were sameclass non-study RSW’s in C1, but were BCW’s consistently paired with T1 words in C2.
T4 words were BCW’s regardless of context, and were paired with T3 words in C1 but
paired with T2 words in C2.
On each training trial, a sample shape (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) appeared
in the center of the top third of the computer screen and two words appeared on either
side of the bottom third of the screen (i.e., a T1-T2 pair or a T3-T4 pair in C1; a T1-T3
pair or a T2-T4 pair in C2). The left-right positions of the two words in the pair were
randomly determined on each trial, and participants were required to select one of the two
words using a left or right mouse-button press. Correct responses were scored if the
participant selected a contextually-controlled RSW in the presence of the red square
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sample or a contextually-controlled BCW in the presence of the blue circle sample.
Correct responses were followed by the presentation of a happy face and a pleasant chime
sound, whereas incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of a sad face and
an unpleasant buzz sound. A cash reward of $100 was promised and awarded to the
participant who completed training with the fewest number of errors.
Each training block consisted of 20 trial sets consisting of some number of trials
(see Table 4). Each trial set was comprised of four problems. In illustration of the four
problems in the first trial set, Problem 1 consisted of a C1 magenta background with a red
square sample, T11 and T21 as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being T11.
Problem 2 consisted of a C1 magenta background with a blue circle sample, T11 and T21
as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being T21. Problem 3 consisted of a C2
green background with a red square sample, T11 and T31 as comparison stimuli, with the
correct response being T11. Finally, Problem 4 consisted of a C2 green background with a
blue circle sample, T11 and T31 as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being
T31. The order of set presentation was randomly determined at the beginning of each
block. The number of trials required to complete a set depended on the participants’
performance. Each set always began in either C1 or C2, counterbalanced across
participants. The first time a comparison word pair appeared in a set of trials (or after a
context switch), the sample was randomly determined and stayed the same on each trial
until the participant made two consecutive correct responses. At that point the sample
shape changed from square to circle or from circle to square, but the comparison stimuli
were unchanged (with the exception that comparison position was randomly determined
on each trial). Once the participant made two consecutive correct responses to the second
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Table 4
The sample and comparison stimuli presented in each trial set during the contextually
controlled interrelated conditional discrimination training of Experiment II

Context 1

Set

Context 2

Problem 1

Problem 2

Problem 3

Problem 4

Sample:

Sample:

Sample:

Sample:

Red Square

Blue Circle

Red Square

Blue Circle

Comparison

Comparison

Comparison

Comparison

Stimuli

Stimuli

Stimuli

Stimuli

RSW

BCW

RSW

BCW

RSW

BCW

RSW

BCW

Set 1

T11

T21

T11

T21

T11

T31

T11

T31

Set 2

T12

T22

T12

T22

T12

T32

T12

T32

Set 3

T13

T23

T13

T23

T13

T33

T13

T33

Set 4

T14

T24

T14

T24

T14

T34

T14

T34

Set 5

T15

T25

T15

T25

T15

T35

T15

T35

Set 6

T16

T26

T16

T26

T16

T36

T16

T36

Set 7

T17

T27

T17

T27

T17

T37

T17

T37

Set 8

T18

T28

T18

T28

T18

T38

T18

T38

Set 9

T19

T29

T19

T29

T19

T39

T19

T39

Set 10

T110

T210

T110

T210

T110

T310

T110

T310

Set 11

T31

T41

T31

T41

T21

T41

T21

T41
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Table 4 (cont.)
Set 12

T32

T42

T32

T42

T22

T42

T22

T42

Set 13

T33

T43

T33

T43

T23

T43

T23

T43

Set 14

T34

T44

T34

T44

T24

T44

T24

T44

Set 15

T35

T45

T35

T45

T25

T45

T25

T45

Set 16

T36

T46

T36

T46

T26

T46

T26

T46

Set 17

T37

T47

T37

T47

T27

T47

T27

T47

Set 18

T38

T48

T38

T48

T28

T48

T28

T48

Set 19

T39

T49

T39

T49

T29

T49

T29

T49

Set 20

T310

T410

T310

T410

T210

T410

T210

T410

Note. Superscripts denote specific randomly-assigned words of a given Type, and can be
cross-referenced with Figure 2.
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sample shape, the context would switch. Participants would then have to make two
consecutive correct responses to another RSW and two consecutive correct responses to
another BCW in the second context before the set of trials was completed. At the end of a
block of 20 trial sets, the percentage of completely correct trial sets (i.e., when no errors
were made for either of the C1 word pair problems or either of the C2 word pair
problems in the set) was calculated for the block. Training blocks continued until a 90%
trial set accuracy criterion was achieved in a single training block. Those participants
who failed to achieve the accuracy criterion after 100 minutes were given a break and
automatically advanced to the next phase of the experiment; their data are excluded from
analyses. Participants who passed MTS training (or ran out of time) were then required to
leave the laboratory and take a break for approximately 5 min.
Once they returned, participants were told that they were entering a new phase of
the experiment, and were given the same free recall instructions that were presented in
Experiment I. After reading these instructions off of the computer screen, the
experimenter also gave the following verbal instructions to participants: “Even though all
of the words that you are about to see will be familiar to you, when I later ask you to
remember the memory test words, they are just the words that you are about to see. Do
you have any questions?” Any questions were then clarified by the experimenter. The 10
T1 words were then presented on the computer screen one at a time below a red square
for 2 s each with a 2 s inter-stimulus interval. As in the original DRIFT design, the red
square stimulus was presented during the presentation of the study list words in
Experiment II, with the hopes of heightening the false memory effects that come with
“awareness” of the study list words’ red-square interrelation. For participants in the C1
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group, the T1 words were presented on a magenta background in the corresponding C1
font, whereas participants in the C2 group were shown the T1 words on a green
background in the corresponding C2 font.
Following presentation of the study list, participants were shown a reminder
screen instructing them to “Remember the MEMORY TEST words!” and were then
handed a one page article on global dimming, which they were asked to read as a
distractor task. The background color and font of the reminder screen was appropriate to
context, and remained on the computer screen throughout the distractor task and during
the recall period. After reading the article, participants were given a pen and a blank sheet
of paper and were instructed to write down as many of the Memory Test (T1 free recall)
words as they could remember, and to notify the experimenter when they had finished.
Then the experimenter manually entered the recalled words into the computer for scoring,
making corrections for misspellings, plurality, or suffix substitutions. No awareness data
were collected.
Results
As can be seen in Table 5, there were no significant differences between the C1
and C2 groups in mean age, mean years of education, proportion of females (coded as 0)
and males (coded as 1), mean number of blocks taken to complete discriminative training,
mean number of total errors made during discriminative training, mean number of
erroneously recalled T0 words, or mean number of correctly recalled T1 words. In
summary, context was not related to these demographic and performance variables, as
anticipated.
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Table 5
T-test comparisons of the C1 and C2 groups on demographic and control variables in
Experiment II

Total (N = 48)

C1 (n = 22)

C2 (n = 26)

Variable

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

t

p

Age

19.79

2.11

19.55

2.11

20.00

2.14

-0.74

.46

Sex

.33

.48

.23

.43

.42

.50

-1.44

.16

Education

13.17

1.16

13.09

1.15

13.23

1.18

-0.41

.68

Blocks

9.19

2.77

9.00

1.98

9.35

3.32

-0.43

.67

Errors

119.31

42.93

122.73

46.60

116.42

40.27

0.53

.61

T0 Recall

0.21

.50

0.18

0.50

0.23

0.51

-0.33

.74

T1 Recall

5.96

1.93

5.55

1.95

6.31

1.89

-1.37

.18

Note. Females were coded as 0, and males were coded as 1.
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Experiment II intrusion data can be seen in Figure 5. A 2 x 3 (Context Group x
Intrusion Type) mixed-design ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for
sphericity indicated a significant main effect of Context Group, (1, 46) = 6.30, p = .016,
partial η2 = .12. The main effect of Intrusion Type was also significant, F(1.95, 89.83) =
8.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .16. However, the two significant main effects must be
interpreted in light of a significant interaction between Context Group and Intrusion Type,
F(1.95, 89.83) = 4.32, p = .017, partial η2 = .09. Post hoc analyses were conducted by
analyzing the simple main effect of Intrusion Type at each level of Context Group using
pairwise comparisons and a Bonferroni correction. Within the first Context Group (C1),
there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p
= .424), the difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions was significant
(p = .001), and there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and
T3 intrusions (p = .122). Within the second Context Group (C2), there was a significant
difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .004), there was no
significant difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p = .308), and
there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p
= .247). Thus, elevated intruding was evidenced for those words assigned to the same
class as the T1 study list words, in accordance with the contextual control of class
membership.

Mean Number of Intrusions (SE)
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1.6

T2
T3
T4

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
C1

C2
Context

Figure 5. The interaction between memory test Context and Intrusion Type in
Experiment II.

Experiment II Discussion
The results of Experiment II suggest that the remembering function of the T1
words was differentially acquired by the T2 and T3 words depending on the memory test
context, thereby demonstrating the engineered contextual control of semantic false
memory phenomena. As with Experiment I, these results were obtained in the absence of
tests of symmetry and transitivity, indicating that equivalence testing is not a necessary
component of the DRIFT paradigm.
By visual inspection, the highest levels of intruding came from non-study words
assigned to the same class as study words within a given context, intermediate levels of
intruding came from non-study words that were assigned to a different class but had
frequently co-occurred with study words within a given context, and the lowest levels of
intruding came from non-study words that were assigned to a different class and had
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never co-occurred with study words regardless of context. There are at least two
explanations for this graded pattern of intrusions. One possibility is that the indirect
acquisition of stimulus functions is especially likely among stimuli assigned to the same
class within a given context, but also somewhat likely among stimuli that have frequently
co-occured within a given context. That is, it is possible that stimulus co-occurrence is
indeed causally related to intruding, but that functional relationships (e.g., the
manipulation of contingencies that lead to derived relational responding) exhibit stronger
control over intruding. Alternatively, participants may have not fully discriminated the
contextual stimuli, resulting in the formation of a class consisting of T1 words along with
differential numbers of T2 and T3 words. That is, given only partial discrimination of the
contextual stimuli, there would still be some context-dependent differences between T2
and T3 words in their susceptibility to function acquisition, though class membership
would not be completely determined by context. These two explanations are not mutually
exclusive; stimulus co-occurrence and incomplete contextual control could have operated
simultaneously to produce the observed effects. In all cases, the functional relationship
between stimuli would appear to play an important role in accounting for the observed
pattern of intrusions.
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General Discussion
The present study demonstrates that false memory phenomena can be brought
under contextual control: words sharing a contextually-controlled conditionally
discriminative function with study words were more likely to be intruded when a memory
test occurred in the corresponding context, relative to words that did not share a common
conditionally discriminative function. Thus, it would appear that the behaviors
constituting false memory phenomena can take the form of contextually-controlled
functional equivalence responding (see Donahoe & Palmer, 2004; Dougher & Markham,
1994; Dougher & Markham, 1996; Goldiamond, 1962, 1966; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988).
Furthermore, the present results were obtained without resorting to experimentally
preexisting semantic relationships (c.f. Deese, 1959a, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott,
1995), and without testing for symmetry or transitivity (see Sidman & Tailby, 1982).
Instead, it would appear that contextually-controlled semantic relationships were
produced through contextual MTS training alone, as evidenced by higher rates of
intruding for words that had been assigned to be semantically related to study words
within the constraints of contextual control. The present results are consistent with other
research indicating the viability of equivalence relations as a satisfactory behavior
analytic account of semantic meaning (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005; Guinther &
Dougher, 2010; Hayes & Bisset, 1998), and show that the DRIFT paradigm can be
usefully modified for the purposes of studying semantic false memory phenomena.
Under the original DRIFT design (Guinther & Dougher, 2010), participants were
given tests of symmetry and transitivity during MTS training, permitting a demonstration
of stimulus equivalence responding in a subgroup of participants. Furthermore, those
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participants who exhibited stimulus equivalence responding were also more likely to
exhibit higher levels of intruding for T3 non-study words that had been assigned to the
same class as T1 study words (i.e., they were more likely to exhibit class-specific
functional equivalence responding). There are at least three reasons to suspect that testing
for stimulus equivalence responding could have influenced subsequent functional
equivalence responding. First, stimulus equivalence testing required that same-class
words appear simultaneously, thereby introducing a source of stimulus co-occurrence for
T1 and T3 words. To the extent that stimulus co-occurrence builds “associations” in
cognitive networks (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992),
one would expect that equivalence testing could have lead to increased levels of intruding
for same-class T3 words. Second, people will sometimes exhibit stimulus equivalence
responding with respect to stimuli that have historically co-occurred (Barnes et al., 1996;
Leader et al., 1996; Tonneau, Arreola, & Martinez, 2006). To the extent that cooccurrence leads to stimulus equivalence responding and to the extent that the learning
histories capable of producing stimulus equivalence responding are the same as the
learning histories capable of producing functional equivalence responding, one would
expect that co-occurrence during stimulus equivalence testing could have lead to
increased levels of intruding for same-class T3 words. (These two explanations, however,
do not take in to account the fact that differently-classed incorrect comparisons also cooccurred with T1 words during stimulus equivalence testing.) Third, testing for stimulus
equivalence could have established the experimental context as a “context of relating”
(see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), thereby increasing the likelihood that
participants would derive stimulus equivalence relations and functional equivalence
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relations. Thus, establishing the experimental context as a context of relating could have
lead to increased levels of intruding for same-class T3 words. However, elevated sameclass intrusions (Experiment I) and elevated contextually-controlled same-class intrusions
(Experiment II) were also obtained in the current DRIFT designs, which did not include
tests for stimulus equivalence. Thus, while further experimentation would be required to
determine whether stimulus equivalence testing influences subsequent intruding, stimulus
equivalence testing does not appear to be a necessary component of the DRIFT paradigm.
As was the case in our original DRIFT study (Guinther & Dougher, 2010), we
found no definitive evidence of an effect of stimulus co-occurrence on subsequent false
recall in the current designs. In particular, the results of Experiment I provide no evidence
of an effect of co-occurrence but do provide evidence for an effect of functional
relationships (i.e., the manipulation of contingencies leading to derived relational
responding would appear to account for the elevated levels of T3 intruding). In contrast,
the results of Experiment II could be partially explained by an appeal to a combination of
stimulus co-occurrence and functional relationships, though they could also be explained
through an appeal to functional relationships alone. As was the case in the original
DRIFT design, stimulus co-occurrence was confounded with class membership during
MTS training, a factor that could have overridden any potential effect of stimulus cooccurrence. Thus, though co-occurrence may indeed play a role in producing false
memory phenomena, an appeal to functional relationships would appear to be necessary
when accounting for the present findings.
In a related vein, under the original DRIFT design we found that higher levels of
MTS training achievement were associated with lower levels of intruding for words
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assigned to a different class from study list words. We labeled this finding a “semantic
suppression” effect, and noted that some participants reported that they had considered
writing down differently-classed non-study words during recall but then decided against
this course of action in recognition of differential class membership (e.g., “I thought
about writing down garden, but then I didn’t because I knew it was a circle word but all
of the memory test words were square words.”). A semantic suppression effect may also
be reflected in the performances of Aware participants in Experiment I, who intruded no
T2 words despite their frequent co-occurrence with T1 words. However, it is unclear why
this ostensible semantic suppression effect would be evident for T2 but not T4 words.
Furthermore, the observed pattern of data may not be especially reliable, reflecting the
performance of only 6 Aware participants relative to 21 Unaware participants. Thus, a
determination of the relationship between Awareness, elevated levels of intruding for
semantically related same-class non-study words, and the semantic suppression of
differently-classed non-study words requires further replication and experimentation.
While the conditions that lead to the behaviors that constitute false memory
phenomena are an important target of investigation, an understanding of false memory
has broader implications for the development of a fuller understanding of interpretation
and meaning. The original DRIFT design and Experiment I can be thought of as methods
for generating synonyms (i.e., T1 and T3 words come to “mean the same thing” as a
result of MTS training), whereas the design of Experiment II can be thought of as a
method for generating homonyms (i.e., as a result of contextually-controlled MTS
training, T1 words come to “mean the same thing” as T3 words in one context, but T1
words come to “mean the same thing” as T2 words in another context). Once such newly-
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acquired meanings are in place, they would appear to interact with peoples’
interpretations of events. That is, as a general rule, people do not simply remember an
event, but rather tend to remember their subjective interpretations of the meaning of the
event, as manifest in a combination of “true” and “false” recollections of the event (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Thus, one can alter people’s recollections of an event by
altering people’s interpretations of the meaning of the event.
The results of Experiment II suggest that people can interpret the meaning of a
single event (e.g., the presentation of a list of words) in multiple different ways,
depending on learning history and contextual variables. This finding has some interesting
implications that could lead to the development of more effective therapeutic
technologies. For example, cognitive therapy (Beck, 1976) is explicitly concerned with
cognitive biases, and has proven to be effective in the treatment of a variety of mental
disorders. The memory structures (e.g., semantic networks, associative networks,
prototypes, etc.) thought to underlay false memory phenomena are akin to the
dysfunctional mental schema thought by cognitive therapists to underlay maladaptive
behaviors (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). However, the theoretical rationale of cognitive
therapy is largely based in prediction and relies on hypothetical mental structures that
cannot be directly manipulated. Thus, the ability to influence false memory phenomena
directly through the manipulation of environmental variables, as opposed to merely
predicting these phenomena, may more effectively translate into an ability to influence
maladaptive health behaviors.
We believe Experiment II provides a rough behavior analytic model of some of
the cognitive biases that are sometimes attributed to hypothetical mental schema. For
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example, C1 could be representative of a depressive schema and C2 could be
representative of an adaptive schema, leading to the biased recollection of depressive
material (e.g., T3 words) or adaptive material (e.g., T2 words), respectively. Consistent
with this contention, a recent study by Ruci, Tomes, and Zelenski (2009) suggests that
one important contextual variable that can bias recollections is a person’s own mood.
These researchers used mood inductions to place participants in either a positive,
negative, or control mood, and then gave them valenced DRM word lists consisting of
either positive (e.g., beautiful, sweet, wish), negative (e.g., anger, trash, smoke), or
control (e.g., pen, chair, needle) words. It was found that participants were more likely to
intrude the DRM lists’ critical root words when participants’ induced mood was
congruent with the valence of the study list. A clinical implication of this finding is that a
person’s mood could serve as a contextual variable controlling the distorted recollection
of events. In turn, these distorted recollections could perpetuate the initial mood. But as
was the case with the original DRM paradigm, the mood-congruent semantic associations
and false memories of the Ruci et al. study were based in relationships that had been
established prior to experimentation. That is, although an important phenomenon was
illuminated, their procedures allowed prediction but not influence. In contrast, the DRIFT
paradigm is explicitly concerned with the exploration of environmental variables that can
be manipulated in the service of influencing biases in memory. It is our hope that ongoing
translational research using the DRIFT paradigm can be used to develop new therapeutic
technologies that help people interpret, reinterpret, and recollect their experiences in
ways that promote adaptive functioning.
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